Representatives from the Arctic States at the 12th Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, June 2021. | Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs/Gunnar Vigfússon.
The Arctic now faces three power struggles: the post-Cold War tensions between the West and a recovering Russia, the power transition from the West to the East and the demise of the Western alliance between Europe and US. As the Arctic Sea ice melts, the questions surrounding power and influence between the existing and aspiring stakeholders are becoming more fluid, it is important that the existing international regime accepts this reality and learns to adapt to the rapidly changing ecosystem, else, it will once again face the brutal shock of realizing not just the shattered illusion of ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ but the Arctic order itself.
Introduction
The Arctic Council - the primary regional governance structure - was created in 1996 as an intergovernmental forum[1] to strengthen circumboreal governance in the region. The Arctic region was perceived to be exceptional to all or any of the global changes until the pause of the Arctic Council post the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022. Since then, Arctic cooperation had been paused between the A7[2] (who are all now NATO member states) and Russia. However, there has been a partial resumption of the Arctic Council Working Group in the virtual mode.
With Arctic exceptionalism that has long been touted as the normative concept that prescribed the Arctic as a unique region with a set of unwritten rules, beliefs and history that has given it a level of immunity to many of the world’s geopolitical problems’[3] shattered, the Arctic today faces not just the reality of global tensions but also serious challenges of climate change monitoring, human security and scientific cooperation, forming the basis of Arctic cooperation.[4]
Russia was expelled from the G8 (Group of 8) following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and the top intergovernmental political forum became the G7. However, the Arctic Council continued to stay resilient to external shocks and functioned effectively. Even though such a shock should have signalled a warning to the Arctic Council, the signals seem to have been misconstrued for the Arctic Council’s strength and resilience to navigate through any further global shocks. The Arctic Council model of Science-policy coordination was promoted as a global model to resolve conflicts and address global challenges, including in the Himalayan region. Today’s unfortunate reality is that the Arctic is no longer exceptional but mirrors the global geopolitics and power rivalry amongst various stakeholders.
Arctic: An Emerging Strategic and Military Hotspot
The academic and scientific community underestimated that there would ever be a hard security challenge in the region once again similar to the Cold War era or that there would be a pause in scientific cooperation. On the other hand, military war schools across the Arctic states always understood the strategic importance of the Arctic from a military perspective and predicted the need to be prepared to engage in the icy cold terrain due to its increasing global importance. General Billy Mitchell in his address to the US Congress in 1935 said, “I believe that in the future, whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is the most important strategic place in the world”, clearly pointing to the strategic importance of the Arctic. The same has been reiterated once again by Brigadier General Donn H. Hill on Oct 28, 2020, in a panel discussion on geopolitics and great power competition in the Arctic hosted by The Command and General Staff College’s Cultural and Area Studies Office in the US.[5]
In the same discussion, Brigadier General Louis Lapointe highlighted the importance of having the boots on the ground on a permanent basis and the value of investing in the Arctic as the Bering Strait will be Gibraltar or the Strait of Hormuz’ in the next 50 years.
He also cited Senator Dan Sullivan saying that, “The Arctic is growing as an economic and strategic hotspot, as well as an area that requires military deterrence”.[6] This clearly shows that military doctrines continue to see the region as a strategic and military hotspot that requires military deterrence.
Russia’s position on Arctic governance has also seen a substantial change since 2022. Russia has amended its Arctic policy, emphasizing on self-reliance and building its strength to protect its economic interest in energy and shipping in the Arctic and also omits any mention of collaboration with other Arctic states through the Arctic Council, Arctic Five or Barents Euro-Arctic Council.[7] Russia is also looking to establish a scientific base in Barentsburg (Svalbard) along with the BRICS nations,[8] and has been calling for greater BRICS plus cooperation in the region. The US on the other hand is working to increase its capacities in the Arctic due to the threat of the growing Russia-China partnership in the Arctic. The only silver lining to date has been the agreement between the eight Arctic member states in February 2024, agreeing to resume the Arctic Council working group activities in a virtual format.[9]
With the Trump administration in power in the US, the focus on the Arctic has gained more momentum. However, this has been an extremely one-dimensional approach, primarily focusing on hard security, resource acquisition and a rejection of multilaterals, while avoiding any mention of the challenges faced by the Arctic inhabitants due to climate change, which is both a serious regional as well as global security challenge. The idea to acquire Greenland has gained momentum since it is seen as a strategic asset for American security, and to which there has been a strong and vehement response from the Danish and Greenland administration.
US Vice President JD Vance with Second Lady Usha Vance at the US military’s Pituffik Space Base on 28th March 2025 in Pituffik, Greenland. | Jim Watson for Pool/Getty Images.
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, has sought a collective and robust response from the European Union states against any such misadventures by the United States of America.[10] Meanwhile, the chairship of the Arctic Council moving from Norway to Denmark will not just put the focus on Greenland but also on its ability to restart functioning; while the US and Greenland (Denmark) are at loggerheads with each other, Russia is still being ostracised and the US is unlikely to sign any declaration as long as climate change is mentioned. The US and Canada have been long-standing partners in Arctic cooperation, especially in areas of defence and security. However, the tariff war between the two Arctic neighbours has caused friction and discomfort.
The February 2025 Oval Office meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky caused significant strain within the Western alliance. Although recent efforts towards peace talks and diplomatic re-engagement have eased some tensions, the relationship remains fragile, and any further instability could eventually spill over into the Arctic, exacerbating divisions within the NATO alliance. With these tensions, the Arctic Council could find it increasingly difficult to function effectively. The once celebrated ‘Arctic Consensus’ is proving far more fragile than it seemed.
Role of Non-Arctic States in the Arctic
The Arctic will face another challenge now due to the increasing interest and presence of the non-Arctic states in the region. Observers to the Arctic Council have always had a limited role to play within the Arctic Council and they have always been seated on the junior table in all its meetings.[11] Neither can they independently propose any project nor exceed the contribution of the Arctic states,[12] and also cannot set any agenda or participate in discussions. Arctic observers can only make written submissions. The approach of the member states has been to restrict the role of the observers to the Arctic Council.[13] The speech by then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2019 at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting also divided the states into two distinct categories - the Arctic and Non-Arctic states - and pointed out that no third category of ‘Near Arctic States’ exists.[14] This is not just a pushback against China but also to all other non-regional players who are seeking to internationalize the Arctic region. Thus, the member states have always adopted an approach to ‘integrate but hedge’ the Asian observer states in similar lines to the inclusion of China in the WTO.[15]
The growing role of non-Arctic states, particularly the Asian powers, has always been critically viewed in the region. The most common argument in many scholarly articles and Western media on the Asian states is that of offensive realists. They argue that the Asian states utilize their presence and Arctic cooperation as a trojan horse to undermine the sovereignty of the Arctic states and adopt a zero-sum approach to enter the region merely to exploit Arctic resources in order to meet their economic, political and strategic goals.[16]
The Asian observer states are seen through the lens of ‘Polar Orientalism’, defined by Dodds as ‘a way of representing, imagining, seeing, exaggerating, distorting and fearing the East and its involvement in the Arctic affairs’.[17]
Yet, such an approach is shallow and fails to inform us of the complete narrative and reasoning of their increasing presence, role, contribution and expanding interest in the region. Resources are certainly an important factor for both the growing interest of the Arctic and non-Arctic states in the region but it is not the only factor. Could these states be seeking something more from the region, such as status, identity-building or such other ‘club goods’, meaning goods that are exclusive and for equal consumption for all stakeholders?[18]
The Asian states have been increasing their voice for a stronger legal framework in the Arctic and strengthening their role as stakeholders by becoming party to some of the important treaties and agreements in the region, such as the Polar Code,[19] Svalbard Treaty[20] and the Unregulated Fisheries Agreement in the Central Arctic Ocean.[21] They have been increasing their Track II diplomacy with various other stakeholders in the region through alternate platforms, while the Arctic Council is functioning at its minimal. The understanding of the Asian states’ engagement through the lens of realism or liberalism would be lopsided or be an incomplete understanding of the roles played by the Asian states in Arctic governance.
The Arctic identity of these states is based on their history, culture, education, environmental challenges, gender and diverse stakeholders, including civil society. Sub-national and local governments play a critical role. The rise of the Global South and its increasing interest and presence as a larger stakeholder in global governance platforms have been attempted to be barricaded by the Western power structures or limited to the call at the least. In the present scenario, it is important for Arctic governance models to adopt a positive-sum approach for mutual benefit rather than a mere zero-sum approach.
During the Cold War, the Arctic was still a frozen region, both literally and figuratively, and the two Arctic states, the United States and the Soviet Union, were the two global superpowers. Hence, finding a solution towards Arctic governance was possible within the region. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the world order began to be dominated by a single pole, the US. During the era of US-led unipolarity, the Arctic Council could function smoothly under the cooperative framework. Today, the G7 is feared to be countered by BRICS+ polices in shaping a multipolar world order, the Global South is becoming increasingly more assertive, pushing for reforms in multilateral governance.
This changing dynamic is also beginning to impact the Arctic as well. It is no longer impacted by the great power conflict of just the US and Russia as the two poles in the Cold War era, it is also now shaped by the changing dynamics of global geopolitics with emerging players from the Global South such as China, India and Brazil challenging the established world order and advocating for a multipolar framework.
Conclusion
The Arctic now faces three power struggles: ‘the post post-Cold War tensions between the West and the recovering Russia, the power transition from the West to East’[22] and the demise of the Western alliance between Europe and the US. ‘As the Arctic Sea Ice melts, the questions surrounding power and influence between the existing and aspiring stakeholders are becoming more fluid’.[23] It is important that the existing regime accepts this reality and learns to adapt to the rapidly changing ecosystem. Otherwise, it will once again face the brutal shock of realizing not just the shattered illusions of Arctic exceptionalism but the Arctic order itself.
(Exclusive to NatStrat)
Endnotes:
