Raiders in Kashmir: A Story of Kashmir as told by Major General Akbar Khan (1947-1948) – Part II

Team NatStrat

The second part of the two-part compilation of extracts begins with the fighting on the main axis road, facing Uri, and ends with the Major General’s view on how to liberate Kashmir.

India’s Summer Offensive

Armed invaders

“...On this main axis along the road, facing Uri, in May, the force on our side consisted of one regular battalion, some Frontier scouts, some tribesmen and some Azad units. The Scouts were less than a hundred, the tribesmen were unpredictable as usual, and the Azads in this area were not yet really fighting fit. The last, though in name organised into battalions, were in fact only loose bodies of volunteers equipped with nothing more than rifles….”

“...This meant that of the regular troops, the one battalion opposite Uri and the one company beyond Tithwal were the only ones in the actual fighting area. I had another three companies located further back—one each at Muzaffarabad, Kohala and Bagh—but these were for local defence only, and were not to be moved forward. Out of the third battalion of the brigade, one company was located at Murree (outside Kashmir) and the remainder opposite Poonch, outside my control. The Brigade Headquarters and I were ordered to remain at Murree….”

“....My brigade intelligence officer had been brought from G.H.Q. Azad whatever information was available about the enemy. This consisted of copies of a large number of messages received from the forward areas over the previous four weeks or so—and from these he was able to make a fairly accurate statement of the Indian strength as well as the names of their units. It appeared that the enemy against us, on both sides of the river, consisted of two brigades supported by considerable artillery. They also had some light tanks at Uri, and, of-course, they were well supported by the Indian Air Force….”

“...Against this, upon arrival of the new battalion, my strength would be two battalions, one other rifle company and one platoon of machine guns. Adding the scouts to this would make the total about two and a half battalions. I knew some of the tribesmen and the Azads would be coming back but for the present they were not there….”

“...But such a large force could probably not be used here. The one narrow road, the mountains and the problem of maintenance put a definite limit to the amount of force that the Indians could safely deploy here. And even if such a force could be brought up, it would be enough only for a specific situation. That specific situation may not remain the same as we would be able to upset the balance again by adding a little more to our strength from the Pakistan Army….”

“...There is another question, of greater significance, which arises out of this—and that is, why did the Indians, after their failure here, not seek a military decision in the plains of Pakistan? It may be that they thought they would put themselves in the wrong before the world, even though we had, according to them, given them enough cause and justification for extending the war. Or it may be this as well as the fear that our Army, combined with the tribesmen, would prove too much for them to swallow even in the plains of Pakistan….”

Capture of Pandu Village

“....Pandu village itself appeared to be held only by a half battalion. And if this was to be the point of our attack, all we needed, theoretically speaking, was one and a half battalions for the assault. As it happened, one and a half battalion was all I could raise for the operation. As a part of this would have to stay in reserve, only one battalion would be left meaning a two to one superiority only. But this, combined with the Azads and tribesmen, would be enough….At dawn, seeing that the left column had withdrawn, the harassing parties, Azads, Scouts and tribesmen also fell back thinking that the show was over….”

“.....On the contrary, in terrain like that of Kashmir, our troops, Azads and tribesmen, when used properly together, proved a surprisingly good combination. The troops provided a stable point around which the Azads, with their greater mobility and knowledge of the ground, formed a widespread screen both protective and as eyes and ears of the commander. From this the tribesmen with, their raids, ambushes and threatening unpredictability, dominated an area so large as to be out of all proportion to their numbers—and in addition, they were there for deeper aggressive action such as troops could not normally be expected to undertake….”

“....Towards the end, here and there a few were definitely beginning to handle them properly. We did not get a chance to pool our knowledge and develop a technique—but had the war gone on, this would certainly have been done. One cannot say what might have happened in another few months had the tribesmen and Azads, in full cooperation, begun to be launched on a large scale from the long string of stable points provided by our troops, against the frontage of no less than 200 miles of hills, valleys and woods that no one could have hoped to close effectively….”

Relief of Poonch

“....The only reason later mentioned was that we did not have troops to spare. Yet a fortnight later, after a shocked public had expressed its surprise in the press, we managed to collect together a force of 25,000 men consisting of Azads, tribesmen and regulars. This force also had probably fifty guns of the Pakistan artillery. It would be difficult to deny that only a portion of this force, if brought up earlier, could have prevented the link up. After much planning and preparation the force was ready and we were in a position to cut in the middle the long line of communications stretching from Jammu to Poonch. The very existence of the large Indian force beyond Naushehra was threatened….”.

Major Thangaraju of the Madras Engineering Regiment during the opening of Zojila Pass in 1948. | scroll.in

Jail

“....Seventeen hours ago I had been a Major General, a holder of the Distinguished Service Order, awarded for gallantry and leadership in the field in World War II, Chief of the General Staff of the Pakistan Army, and in the eyes of many the mysterious ‘General Tariq’ credited with acquiring for Pakistan much of the territory of Azad Kashmir at personal risk that some had been there to see themselves….”

“...However, many months passed and nothing happened. Meanwhile with regard to improving our military potential no steps were taken in the only direction that was immediately open to us, namely, the raising of something like a People’s militia, giving military training to the youth and the development of indigenous weapons. For weapons, earlier, I had been able to persuade the Prime Minister to allocate a grant of rupees ten lacs in order to encourage the production of small arms in local workshops in the cities. To my pleasant surprise, within two weeks only, people had brought forth local made sten guns and even 303 cartridges….”

How to Liberate Kashmir Now?

“....A few months after my release from jail, in 1956, I wrote a 30-page pamphlet called “How to solve the Kashmir problem”. 5,000 copies of this were printed. This became the subject of a heated debate in the Indian Parliament and received headlines in some of the Indian Press. The gist of this was that mere repetition of appeals to the U.N. and the Security Council could not possibly bring the U.N into the question as, in fact, there existed no security problem. We would have to help the people of occupied Kashmir to rise for their own freedom—and if in so helping them, the Indian Government accused Pakistan of interference so much the better as this would tend to threaten the existing international peace and only then would there be reason for the U.N…..”

“....President Iskandar Mirza found himself interested and asked what we would need for such internal action. He was surprised when I explained that only 500 men at a time inside Kashmir would be enough. The terrain inside Kashmir was ideally suited for guerrilla and sabotage action—with one major road a few hundred miles long, bending every few furlongs passing through wooded hills and valleys over innumerable bridges and culverts. This road, and the single electric supply line, with telephone and telegraph lines running alongside, could not possibly be protected all the time everywhere. Along this lifeline also lay exposed most of the road and river transport which carried the entire Kashmir trade….”

“....There would have to be a second batch of 500 to keep replacing these— and a third batch of 500 under training. Their technique would have to include patience, prolonged activity, persistence and secrecy. They would need 12 to 18 months operating in an unspectacular manner and only then would the occupied Kashmir people themselves feel truly encouraged to rise en masse. The whole project would cost about rupees 60 lacs (six million)....”

“....Because of the unsolved problem of Kashmir we have been forced to spend the major portion of our national earnings on defence requirements. But apart from military expenditure, I thought that in 1948 and 1949 we spent about 12 crores per annum on the deficit budget of the Azad Government and on allowances to all sorts of others in the tribal areas and elsewhere in order to keep them in readiness for supporting us in Kashmir. If this expenditure has remained still at the figure of 12 crores yearly then by now we must have spent something in the neighbourhood of 300 crores….”

“....For us such a war, after aggression by India, can be not merely the contending of armies but the struggle of an entire people—where grand strategy, or the utilization of all means towards the end, will predominate—and where such a concentration of all our means will be possible. Because, for us, on account of the presence of basic unity, racial homogeneity and oneness of faith, if we are militarily pressed further and further back towards the west, it will be like the pressing of a spring which will become stronger and ultimately recoil with greater force…..”

End of Part II of the two-part compilation of extracts from the book Raiders in Kashmir: Story of the Kashmir War (1947-48), by Major General Akbar Khan DSO of the Pakistan Army.

(Exclusive to NatStrat)