Raiders in Kashmir: A Story of Kashmir as told by Major General Akbar Khan (1947-1948) – Part I

Team NatStrat

Due to its explosive admissions which strike at the foundation of Pakistan’s claims in the United Nations, the book Raiders in Kashmir: Story of the Kashmir War (1947-48), written by Major General Akbar Khan, was banned in Pakistan and went out of print before being republished in India a few years ago. Major General Khan has discussed the raid of 22 October 1947 as the first example of the use of camouflage and deniability, and has gone on to become the Pakistan Army’s mainstay against India in the decades since then. This two-part series of curated extracts from the book highlights the Pakistani State’s foray into attacking India, beginning shortly after Independence.

Introduction

In 1970, the Wafai Printing Press, Karachi, on behalf of a publishing house called “Pak Publishers Limited” printed a book Raiders in Kashmir: Story of the Kashmir War (1947-48) written by Major General Akbar Khan DSO of the Pakistan Army. The book consisting of eighteen chapters reveals how the so called “tribesman” who marched to “liberate” Kashmir on the fateful day of 22 October 1947 were nothing but Pakistan Army regulars in disguise and the “raid” was a covert operation conceived by the Pakistan Army against the Indian State to internationalise the "Kashmir issue”. The raid of 22 October 1947 is the first example of the use of camouflage and deniability, that has gone on to become the Pakistan Army’s mainstay against India in the decades ever since.

Due to its explosive admissions which strike at the foundation of Pakistan’s claims in the UN, the book was banned in Pakistan and went out of print before being republished in India a few years ago. 

As world attention is once again focussed on the Pakistan Army’s use of terror proxies and groups in its fight with India, Prateek Kapil, Senior Fellow, NatStrat and Mallaika Thapar, Research Intern, NatStrat – have compiledin two parts – a few extracts from the book to graphically illustrate the perfidy that characterised the Pakistan Army at that time, which has remained a part of its doctrine with India.

Pakistani tribesmen after entering Kashmir | Ministry of Defence

The Raiders

“...On October 29 (1947), the Pakistani forces captured Baramula where only 3,000 survived out of 14,000. The troops were now only 35 miles from Srinagar when the Maharaja (Hari Singh) sent his papers of accession to Delhi asking for help…”

Revolt

“...The only weapons we could possibly get hold of would be rifles and with regard to these the question was not how many we needed or desired but how many we could obtain. At that time I was Director of Weapons and Equipment at G.H.Q. (the Pakistan Army General Headquarters) and, therefore, I knew the general situation with regard to weapons in possession of the Army. A large part of our share of the reserve stocks of weapons and ammunition was still lying in India. Even if these stocks were in Pakistan there would be no possibility of giving any for Kashmir unless the Government ordered the Commander-in-Chief to do so. Since he was not to be taken into confidence, some other way had to be found to get hold of some rifles. Fortunately, I discovered that a previous Government sanction existed in G.H.Q. for the issue of 4,000 military rifles to the Punjab Police. The police did not appear to be in urgentneed of them since they were not pressing for them. I, therefore, decided to base my proposal on a minimum of 4000 rifles assuming that the police could be ordered to receive these rifles from the Army and make them available for Kashmir….”

“...The authorities needed a lot of assistance from the Army in the shape of plans, advice, weapons, ammunition, communications and volunteers. They did not ask for it because the whole thing had to be kept secret from the Commander-in-Chief and other senior officers who were British. There were, however, also senior Pakistani officers in the Army who could have been taken into confidence—and these were in a position to help a great deal. As it was, at this stage I alone was asked for assistance-and I was junior to at least twenty other Pakistani officers. In the days to come, as I had to keep things secret from everyone, it was to result not only in the loss of their help but also of their good will. And from some there was to come the most damaging intrigue and opposition…”

“...Ultimately, I wrote a plan under the title of “Armed Revolt inside Kashmir”. As open interference or aggression by Pakistan was obviously undesirable, it was proposed that our efforts should be concentrated upon strengthening the Kashmiris themselves internally -- and at the same time taking steps to prevent the arrival of armed civilians or military assistance from India into Kashmir,...”

Tribal Attack

“...Lieutenant Colonel Masud (later Brigadier Tommy Masud) of the Cavalry, offered to help with collecting and storing the condemned ammunition. This he used to issue to Zaman Kiani and Khurshid Anwar when they called for it. Help from the Pakistan Air Force through Air Commodore Janjua and others also started coming in, in the shape of winter clothing, ammunition and some weapons. Khwaja Abdul Rahim, Commissioner Rawalpindi, was another enthusiast who was busy collecting funds, rations, weapons and even volunteers for Kashmir. At his house I met Shaukat Hayat Khan and others when they came to Pindi….”

“...In Pakistan, the same evening, the Prime Minister held an unofficial conference at Lahore to consider the situation arising out of Kashmir’s accession and India’s military intervention. At this conference, among others were also present Colonel Iskander Mirza (then Defence Secretary, later to be Governor-General), Chaudhri Mohd Ali (then Secretary General, later to be Prime Minister), Abdul Qayum Khan, Chief Minister of the Frontier Province and Nawab Mamdot, Chief Minister of the Punjab. Brigadier Sher Khan and I were also invited….”

“...So at sunset, when the aircraft disappeared and the road was safe again, we started back. Rain, mud and traffic made the journey unbearably slow, but there was a pleasant thought to keep company with—armoured cars would get there before the Indians became too strong. To get the armoured cars, however, some objections would have to be answered. It could be argued that India would call this intervention by Pakistan but did that really matter? India herself was intervening. She was already calling us aggressors and she had squarely accused us of bringing the tribesmen in across 200 miles of Pakistan. Would a couple of armoured cars make that accusation any worse?....”

To Srinagar

“...On return to Pindi, I was immediately able to find Colonel Masud, who volunteered to take not two but a whole squadron of his unit armoured cars. His men, he said, would go in plain clothes without official permission and at their own risk. This was indeed a thrilling response to the needs of the occasion, and all seemed well. While they were getting ready I held a consultation with Brigadier Sher Khan, Lt. Colonel Arbab and Raja Ghazanfar….”

“...Later that evening I received a phone call from Abbottabad to say that they would be reaching Pindi at midnight and would come to see me at my house. When Abdul Qayum Khan and Nawab Mamdot, accompanied by Colonel A.S.B. Shah, Secretary for Frontier Region`s, arrived they said that the tribesmen had fallen back 65 miles and all efforts to persuade them to go back to the front had failed and would I take over responsibility from now onwards?...”

“....Half an hour later, I came across Major Aslam (later Brigadier) who was here as a volunteer unknown to me. Like myself he too had no one under command, but he had some information. Earlier that day, or possibly the night before, an Indian Brigade had reached Baramula—and thus, between them and the tribesmen at Uri there was now a distance of some 30 miles….”

Tribal Withdrawal

“...The ex-servicemen were, for a while, something of a puzzle. What they had probably needed was a different kind of handling. Their past training had made them dependent upon a proper system of supplies, communications and medical aid etc. none of which existed here. Here they had no pay and there was no other form of obligation to keep them to their tasks. There were no officers to command them and there was no punishment or other means of enforcing discipline. Some among them had assumed command as section, platoon or company commanders—but this was entirely superficial as in fact they exercised no real authority. Had their own local men of influence, who had collected them, accompanied them here they might have behaved differently. But this had not happened. It was no wonder, therefore, that they disintegrated upon coming face to face with the first signs of real danger. Some of them argued that it was sheer murder—and those that insisted upon carrying on were, in their eyes, mad men….”

Uri and Azad Plans

“....From Uri I was called to G.H.Q. Azad. There, a few days later, I met Sardar Ibrahim and his provisional cabinet. I was also a member of the newly formed Liberation Committee. At this stage the Committee had to assess the situation somewhat from a distance. An early assessment was necessary to formulate some general policy….”

“...My impression was that for the same quantity of ammunition, given to tribesmen and regular soldiers, the tribesmen got equal if not better results even allowing for what they sold. Some months later I was able to confirm my impression from actual facts. 500 tribesmen and 500 regulars used approximately the same quantity of ammunition over a period of three months—and the casualties inflicted were about equal...”

“...In general, therefore, we would have to be content simply with the maintenance of the struggle. And the maintenance itself would require a great deal of organising. And this organising would have to be done mostly by the Liberation Committee and by G.H.Q. Azad. So the Liberation Committee and G.H.Q. Arad proceeded with their efforts to collect resources and to organise the various sectors. For what ultimately happened in the coming days the major portion of the credit must, of course, go to the various Azad sectors where many burdens often had to be carried unaided—but some share must go to the Liberation Committee and G.H.Q. Azad who were the chief organisers. Without these two bodies, the public contribution from Pakistan and Azad Kashmir might not have been so well channelled...”

The Winter Months

“...My seniors had also not been sitting idle. First there was only the holding back of assistance which they were of-course under no obligation to give. Then there was active opposition to officers who had volunteered for service in Kashmir. And this was followed by a campaign against me personally of which I had not been aware at all because of the reason that my whole time and attention had been focused on the problems at the front. I had a minor shock when one day I found myself deprived of three months' command pay on the ground ‘that I had been absent from service’....”

“...A few days later, the Pakistan Government decided to send some troops into Kashmir as a measure of self-defence. These troops were, however, to avoid, till the last possible moment, any direct clash with the Indian army; they were to stay behind the Azad forces, to be there only to prevent any sudden breakthrough to the Pakistan borders by the Indians. With the entry of our troops into Kashmir, the over-all command passed to G.H.Q. Pakistan Army. I was now on leave and on my next arrival with troops I was to have charge of only a limited sector….”

End of Part I of the two-part compilation of extracts from the book Raiders in Kashmir: Story of the Kashmir War (1947-48), by Major General Akbar Khan DSO of the Pakistan Army. Read Part II here.

(Exclusive to NatStrat)