Strategic Dimensions of Polar Studies: An Indian Perspective

Pankaj Saran - Convenor, NatStrat

Speech at National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research, Goa, India on 19 May 2023

I would like to start by thanking NCPOR and its Director Dr. Thamban Meloth for inviting me to the National Conference on Polar Sciences. I am delighted to be here today. I can see from the programme that the Conference has been very intense and rich in its content, covering many areas of polar research.

I would also like to compliment NCPOR for being the pre-eminent research institution on polar studies in India. It has established a well-earned reputation across the world ever since its inception, and was the pioneer for polar studies in India. Many of its scientists have been part of India’s research stations in the Arctic and expeditions  to the Antarctic. The nation owes a debt of gratitude to them.

Policy frameworks

This Conference is special because it is the first Conference after the announcement of India’s Arctic Policy in March 2022 and the adoption of the Indian Antarctic Bill by Parliament in August 2022. Both these documents constitute major milestones in the evolution of India’s polar strategy.

Starting from 1989, India today has two operational research stations in Antarctica named Maitri and Bharati. India has successfully launched 40 annual scientific expeditions to Antarctica till date. Starting with India’s first expedition to the Arctic in 2007 and establishing the research station Himadri in 2008, India became an observer nation in the Arctic Council in 2013. India now belongs to the elite group of nations that have multiple research stations within the Polar Regions.

India’s Arctic Policy is based on six well-defined pillars consisting of science and research, environmental protection, economic and human development, transportation and connectivity, governance and international cooperation and national capacity building.

The main aim of the Antarctic Bill is to ensure de-militarization of the region along with getting it rid of mining or illegal activities. It also aims that there should not be any nuclear test/explosion in the region. The Bill provides a harmonious policy and regulatory framework for India’s Antarctic activities through well-established legal mechanisms and will help in efficient and elective operations of Indian Antarctic Programme. It will also facilitate India’s interest and pro-active involvement in the management of growing Antarctic tourism and sustainable development of fisheries resources in Antarctic waters. It will also help in increased international visibility and credibility of India in polar governance.

The politics of the Arctic Council

The geopolitics surrounding the Arctic and the Antarctic are very different. The Arctic Council is a small self-selected group of countries who have set their own rules and procedures, including which countries to collaborate with as Observers. India is one of the thirteen observers to the Arctic Council, and only one of four Asian nations. This is a matter of not only great privilege but also of recognition of India’s legitimate stakes in the Arctic as well as its capabilities to contribute to Arctic Studies. It is incumbent on us to ensure that we meet all these expectations that have been reposed upon us by the Arctic Council. Other Asian observer nations such as China, Korea, Japan and Singapore have invested significant amounts in Arctic Studies and research. We need to do the same and the policy documents adopted last year provide the requisite platform.

There are differences as well as territorial disputes and rival claims relating to coastal waters, internal waters, maritime boundaries and EEZ among the Arctic Council members. Today, the  Russia-Ukraine conflict has dealt a severe blow to Arctic regional cooperation. Seven of the eight Arctic Council members announced a suspension of participation in all activities of the Council in March 2022 under the Russian Presidency.  Other forms of cooperation with Russia were also suspended.

This breakdown in engagement presents a practical problem, given that Russia is more than or equal to all other Arctic states put together, whether it is the Arctic Ocean coastline, share of Arctic population, natural resources, or hydrocarbon reserves. Russia, therefore, is a major stakeholder and difficult to ignore, as far as the Arctic is concerned.

The growing isolation of Russia, Western sanctions and denial of technology, especially in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction, is increasingly driving Russia into China’s embrace. The two sides are fast developing their cooperation in the Arctic as we saw during the recent visit of the Chinese President to Russia.  Increasing dependence of Russia on China, for its export revenues, technology deficits and supply chains, will greatly enhance China’s leverage and force Russia into an uncomfortable partnership that may result in unwarranted concessions, such as permitting enhanced Chinese military presence in the Arctic.  Greater Chinese presence in the Arctic  will not be welcomed by the other Arctic Council members. Clearly, there is a need for India to remain engaged in the region.

Militarisation of the Arctic

 All States speak against the militarisation of the Arctic. Yet the reality is different. The Arctic was a zone of cooperation even during the height of Cold War. It was one of the two areas where the Americans and the Soviets/Russians collaborated. Russia has substantially beefed up its military presence in the Arctic. In 2021, Russia’s Murmansk-based Northern Fleet was upgraded to the status of a Military District. In 2021, Russia also released its strategy for the Arctic for the period up to 2035, stating its intentions to develop the region’s abundant hydrocarbon and mineral resources, and establish the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as the preferred international shipping route.

USA has not remained behind in ramping up its Arctic presence. In October 2022, the US released the second edition of its Arctic Strategy. That made it the only country in the world to have separate Arctic strategies of its Departments of Defence as well as Interior, the three wings of its Armed Forces and its Coast Guard and reflects the increased strategic importance of the Arctic in its calculus. The US maintains six military bases in the Arctic. In 2022, the US Army established the 11th Airborne Division in the Arctic, placing about 12,000 soldiers under a single command for Arctic military operations.

Apart from Russia and USA, China is the latest entrant to the big power contestation in Arctic. A self-professed ‘Near-Arctic State’, it has doubled its investments in the region in the last ten years with a focus on critical minerals extraction, expansion of its scientific activities, and using these scientific engagements to conduct dual-use research with intelligence or military applications in the Arctic. China is also expanding its icebreaker fleet. It will be the only country apart from Russia to operate a nuclear ice-breaker and has sent PLA Navy ships into the Arctic for the first time.

India does not have any such military ambitions, nor does it want to get involved in major power rivalry. Yet it is important to be mindful of these broader strategic moves by the major powers.

Why is the interest in the Arctic growing?

 The reason is simply global warming induced Arctic ice melt. The Arctic is expected to be ice free by 2050. This has catapulted the region to a point at which several issues of global consequence intersect. These are climate change, increased accessibility to and availability of resources, and global strategic contestation.

Another unique feature of the Arctic is that the climate changes in the region are being caused by anthropogenic factors external to the region and in turn these changes are accelerating the pace of climate change in the world.

As India, we should neither be defensive nor unsure about our strategic interests in the Arctic or the Antarctic. We have real interests which affect our future.

Climate and Water security

The study of the Arctic is critical to India. It influences our monsoons which directly impact agriculture sector, on which almost 60 per cent of India’s population is dependent. The rising sea levels due to the Arctic ice melt also threaten India’s 1,300 island territories and maritime features and the welfare of 1.4 billion Indians. The Arctic melt also helps Indian scientists to better understand the glacial melt in the Himalayas, which is the largest source of freshwater outside the poles and home to almost all of India’s perennial rivers, whose deltas sustain almost 70 per cent of India’s population.

Energy and mineral security

The increasingly accessible Arctic has the potential to address India’s rising energy needs and its deficiencies in strategic rare earth elements. We have to keep in mind the future needs of the Indian economy as we seek to double our GDP and per capita consumption of raw materials. India will need resources from all regions and sources to cater to its vast population.

According to the US Geological Survey, the Arctic constitutes the largest unexplored prospective areas for hydrocarbons on Earth. It holds an estimated 13 per cent of the world's undiscovered conventional oil resources and 30 per cent of its undiscovered conventional natural gas resources. These resources account for about 22 per cent of the world's undiscovered, technically recoverable hydrocarbon resources.  Several minerals such as copper, phosphorus, platinum and rare earths as well as coal resources can be found in the Arctic. These are key to the EV and renewable energy revolutions.  In addition, several precious and semi-precious metals are to be found. The Arctic also has vast potential for renewable energy such as hydro, wind, solar, geothermal and ocean energy.

In March 2018, India received its first liquefied natural gas shipment from the Russian Arctic, supplied by Novatek’s plant at Yamal. India also received its first LNG shipment in 2018 from Gazprom from a plant in Yamal in the Arctic.  These are concrete examples of meeting India’s energy security needs.

NSR and Connectivity, logistics and maritime security

Issues of connectivity, maritime security and the NSR need much more inter-disciplinary study by Indian experts in the fields of the navy, international law, science, trade and strategic affairs.

 The strategic importance of the two Poles also impacts India’s maritime security. The Malacca Strait is one of the most important international maritime routes, with nearly 90,000 to 100,000 vessels crossing it annually. It carries more than 95 per cent of all international vessel traffic. However, the route is facing challenges such as heavy vessel traffic, delays in shipping, piracy and armed robbery, accidents caused by narrow crossings and occasional fog.

The prospect of the Northern Sea Route can address some of these issues.  The NSR can shorten the shipping time by approximately fourteen days as the route is forty per cent shorter and can save upto 550,000 USD in fuel expense. If commercial traffic is diverted through the NSR, the criticality of Malacca could potentially fall.

There is however more than one view about the NSR.  While some view it as infrastructure for Russian resource extraction and its transportation in the Arctic, others see it as an international transit route between Northeast Asia and Europe and North America, with a potential to transform the way maritime commerce is conducted and to replace the tradition East West route through the Malacca Straits and the Suez Canal.

Since 2015, cargo traffic along the NSR has grown almost fivefold, reaching 33 million tons in 2020 when there were 64 voyages on the NSR compared with 37 in 2019. Russia has set a target of 80 million tons of cargo through NSR by 2025.  Even this target is miniscule compared to the volume of traffic through the Panama Canal.

 Despite much enthusiasm and optimism about transportation through NSR, it is not going to replace the traditional shipping route anytime soon. There are real disadvantages of NSR vis-à-vis the traditional east West Suez Route.

These include the inability to leverage economies of scale in container shipping,  unpredictable ice flows resulting in the need for more ice breakers, higher fuel costs and slower speeds. The shipping season in the Arctic only lasts for a few months. Icebreakers and other special  equipment would sit idle the remainder of the year. Thus, from the perspective of a shipper or a ship owner, a shorter via the Arctic does not necessarily mean cheaper and faster. Considerable investment in navigation-related infrastructure would also be required if trans-Arctic shipping is to become a reality.

 The major gainers of the opening of NSR would be the Northeast Asian ports of Japan, South Korea and China. The major looser is going to be Singapore. If NSR is navigable through the year, it is estimated that 1/3  to 1/2 of China-EU trade can be transported through the Arctic.  The NSR would mitigate China’s Malacca dilemma to a large extent and would entail re-evaluation of the strategic maritime advantage that India holds. Between 2013 and 2020, 33 Chinese ships made 42 voyages across the NSR. These are by far the most for any country after Russia.

On the positive side, shipping allows India to offer specialised training for officer grade seafarers and Ice-pilots. This coupled with India’s IT prowess can help far flung regions in the Arctic. There will be big opportunities for development of port infrastructure for our companies.

There is another dimension to connectivity from India’s point of view – the possibility of operationalising the 7200 km International North-South Transport Corridor, including through Chabahar.  This could link India right upto Russia, and the Nordic and Baltic countries by extending it further north and west. On the Eastern axis, planning is underway for the Vladivostok-Chennai route. Both these axes will link up with a potential NSR.

What should India do?

First, the need to develop a body of expertise that goes well beyond science and research. We need expertise in polar laws, law of the seas, diplomatic affairs, naval strategy, shipping, international trade, energy, rare earths, and of course climate change. We need to broaden our approach to polar matters and build national capacities.

Second, we need to better understand the workings and mechanisms of the Arctic Council and the geopolitics surrounding the Antarctic Treaty. These are highly complex bodies. For example, we have to pursue our strategic interests while avoiding being sucked into great power rivalry or the political and territorial disputes among the Arctic states. We are fortunate to have good relations with all key States. We should use this to full advantage.

Third, be more engaged diplomatically. China, for example,  has annual dialogue mechanisms with Russia and USA.  China, Japan and South Korea have a Trilateral High-Level Dialogue on the Arctic since 2015.  Among the Nordics, China has active, ongoing scientific cooperation with Finland, Sweden and Iceland.

Fourth, we need to more  visible and active in the Arctic Council and all its bodies, Working Groups etc even though we are Observers. India has only three featured projects under the Arctic Council, showing a need to enhance Indian engagement.

Fifth, increase physical presence in the Arctic by having a permanent presence, more research stations and satellite ground stations. We should plan for more voyages along the Arctic coastline, lease of an ice breaker as an interim measure, and training of seamen. We should participate in a Hydrogen Energy Technology Plan.

Finally, when global tensions are running high, this is the time for India to promote its philosophy of  Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam and its vision of ‘One Earth, One Family, One Future’, treating the poles as the true global commons.